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The 1984 Act would appear to be just the sort of legislation Lord Browne-Wilkinson
had in mind. The absence of an action on the statute would point against a remedy in
negligence.
B. CONCLUSION
The outcome in Jain is not surprising given the nature of the loss suffered, the identity
of the defendant and the primary purpose of the legislation. One may still question
whether a more balanced approach might not be developed. The action taken by
the regulator was utterly unreasonable and highly oppressive. Whilst the interests of
residents of care homes must be protected it would be wrong to ignore the interests
of those such as the claimants: “the public interest in the provision of nursing homes,
particularly those who are willing and able to take patients who are not easy to look
after. . . is liable to be affected if the owners of such homes have no recompense for
the dreadful financial consequences of a slipshod, unwarranted application to the
court such as was made here”.15
Were a duty to exist the competing interests could be taken into account in
establishing the standard of care. Considerations which are relevant to the exercise
of reasonable care by a public body but not to a private individual can be taken into
account.16 This approach has been adopted in Burnett and in several other Scottish
public authority liability cases.17 Finally, the House of Lords emphasised that, had the
actions of the regulator occurred after October 2000, an infringement of the Human
Rights Act 1998 might have arisen. It was arguably incompatible with Convention
rights to have closed the home without affording the claimants the opportunity of
showing the application to be insubstantial and based on insufficient grounds.
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A Strange Notice
In Christie Owen and Davies plc, t/a Christie & Co v Campbell1 the pursuers entered
into a “sole-selling rights agreement” with Campbell, in terms of which the pursuers
agreed to market Campbell’s leasehold interest in licensed premises. The pursuers
15 Jain v Trent Strategic Health Authority [2008] QB 246 at 281-282 per Jacob LJ.
16 Just v British Columbia (1989) 64 DLR (4th) 689.
17 See e.g. McCafferty v Secretary of State 1998 SCLR 379 at 382 per Lord Johnston.
1 [2009] CSIH 26, 2009 SLT 518. The opinion of the court was delivered by Lord Clarke. For discussion
of proceedings before the sheriff and the sheriff principal, see R G Anderson, “Intimation 1862-2008”
(2008) 12 EdinLR 275.
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did so, finding a buyer willing to pay £46,000 for an assignation of the lease. As a
result of the transaction, the pursuers became entitled to payment of a commission
of £7,966 plus VAT. Tucked away in the agreement was a clause which ran:
. . . I/we hereby authorise the vendor’s solicitors . . . to pay out of money received by such
solicitors, the fees requested by [the pursuers].
Campbell’s solicitors were the second defenders and the contradictors to the action.
The solicitors had acted for Campbell in the assignation of the lease and it was the
solicitors who held the funds following the assignation of Campbell’s lease. Following
the settlement of the lease transaction, the pursuers sent a letter to the solicitors
enclosing their fee note. The letter stated, “We look forward to receiving payment
in early course. We look forward to hearing from you in due course”.2 The pursuers
were not paid. The report does not disclose any commercial reason why the solicitors
refused to pay. The only reason argued was that, although the clause in the agreement
was capable of being an assignation,3 there had been no proper intimation of the
assignation. But there is no indication in any of the opinions that the solicitors had
paid away the moneys they admittedly held or that they had received a competing
claim to payment and were thus in double-distress. The solicitors even conceded
before the court that if the documents had been read when they were received then
they would have been “left in no real doubt that the appellants fell to be paid the
sum in question”.4 And, in any event, providing no other interests intervene between
intimation and the raising of the action, the production of the assignation in process
amounts to judicial intimation,5 which is the “best of all intimations”.6 This point does
not appear to have been raised at any stage in the case.
A. THE LAW
Before the Extra Division, two principles were discussed: first, whether sending a
letter together with a large commercial agreement to which the debtor is not party
is sufficient intimation; and, second, whether intimation not complying with the
terms of the Transmission of Moveable Property (Scotland) Act 1862 requires to be
acknowledged.
(1) A preliminary issue
Nowhere in the opinion of the sheriff, sheriff principal, or the Division, is there
recognition that, in Christie, there was no competition. Intimation serves at least two
purposes.7 One is to inform the debtor of the assignation. The other is to provide a
2 Para 5.
3 Whether such payment instructions should be construed as assignations rather than mandates is
controversial. See Anderson (n 1) at 276 n 7.
4 A concession highlighted by the Division: para 11.
5 See R G Anderson, Assignation (2008) paras 7-16 ff; Anderson (n 1) 279 n 21.
6 Carter v McIntosh (1862) 24 D 925 at 934 per the Lord Justice-Clerk (Inglis).
7 See Anderson (n 1) at 276.
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certain date on which the law holds transfer to occur. Christie was entirely concerned
with the first of these purposes. Rather like the well-known decision in Libertas-
Kommerz,8 therefore, it is questionable whether Christie is any authority for whether
informal intimation without acknowledgement would be valid in a case where there
is a competing assignee or arrester.
(2) Covering letters and intimation
The sheriff and the sheriff principal took the commercial and common sense view
that an assignee intimating an assignation should properly communicate what he is
doing in any correspondence. It is not sufficient to send a letter demanding payment
and enclose a full copy of an agreement to which the debtor is not party and which
may be hundreds of pages long. The debtor cannot be expected to trawl through the
provisions of the agreement for his own interest.
Surprisingly, however, the Extra Division took a different view. “Intimate”, Lord
Clarke tersely remarked, “simply means to ‘make known”’.9 By sending the letter
together with a fee note and the agreement, and demanding payment “in accordance
with the [agreement]”, the pursuers had properly intimated the assignation. With
respect, this conclusion may be doubted. A demand for payment may be made on all
sorts of legal grounds. That the pursuers in this case had a contract with Campbell
that entitled them to payment of a commission would not necessarily mean that
there was any entitlement to payment from the solicitors (with whom the pursuers
had no contract). If the demand for payment was based on the pursuers’ position
that they were assignees, the intimation by letter can be effective only if it tells the
debtor that there has been an assignation, where the assignation can be found and, if
the document is large, give the debtor reasonable instructions on where to find the
operative clause.10 In the same way that an insolvency practitioner does not respond
to correspondence if there are no funds to pay him for doing so, solicitors do not read
100-page documents unless they are instructed (and paid) to do so. As it happens,
however, the method of intimation in this case was unusual, for mainstream corporate
and financial practice long ago moved away from complying with the terms of the
Transmission of Moveable Property (Scotland) Act 1862 (which requires a certified
copy of the assignation to be sent to the debtor). The Christie case therefore provides
little support for the standard financial practice of sending to the debtor a clearly
marked letter by recorded delivery, which contains an abbreviated notice signed by
cedent and assignee.
8 Libertas-Kommerz GmbH v Johnson 1977 SC 191.
9 Christie at para 14.
10 A similar issue arose in McLauchlin, Petitioner [2009] CSOH 49. An “on demand” bond granted
by a cautioner stated that a “certificate” by an officer of the lender would be conclusive evidence
of the sums due. The cautioner consented to registration of the bond for execution. The lender
served a charge for payment on the cautioner. The charge expired. The lender sought to do summary
diligence. The petitioner sought suspension on the basis there had been no “certificate” crystallising
the sums due. Lady Stacey held that the sums due were intelligible from the demand letters: see
para 28.
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(3) Acknowledgement
There has been some doubt in practice about whether an acknowledgement from the
debtor is necessary before intimation of an assignation is effective. The law is clear in
principle: an assignation is a transfer of a right against a debtor without the debtor’s
consent. Acknowledgement is thus only of evidential value.11 But it is sometimes
suggested that where the intimation is informal – that is to say, where it does not
conform to the 1862 Act or a recognised equipollent – an acknowledgement from
the debtor would be necessary for a valid intimation.12 The Division, approving the
treatment of the subject provided by Professor Wilson,13 suggests in obiter dicta that
(a) informal intimation is competent and (b) even where the intimation is informal,
no acknowledgement is required.14
B. CONCLUSION
The Christie case is a strange one. Standing back for a moment, it might be queried
how an action for payment of £9,360.65 required the consideration of a sheriff,
a sheriff principal and the Inner House where there was no substantive defence
to the action. The law of intimation is unsatisfactory in a number of respects. Yet
intimation is crucial to practice. The wider questions, raised in a previous note,15 are
not addressed, so the obiter dicta about the general law of informal intimation and
acknowledgment must be taken subject to the important caveat that no competing
assignee or arrester was involved.
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An Opportunity Missed? Some Comments on the
Interpretation and Legislative Reform
(Scotland) Bill
The Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Bill has now been introduced
into the Scottish Parliament,1 following upon a consultation by the Scottish
11 The Transmission of Moveable Property (Scotland) Act 1862, for instance, provides that an
acknowledgement from the debtor is “sufficient” evidence of intimation.
12 See, for instance, Anderson, Assignation (n 5) paras 7-11 ff.
13 W A Wilson, The Scottish Law of Debt, 2nd edn (1991) para 27.3.
14 Christie at para 15.
15 Anderson (n 1).
1 The Bill, together with accompanying documents, is available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/
s3/bills/27-InterpretLegRef.
